Frege and numbers as self-subsistent Objects by Lavers, Gregory
Discusiones Filosóficas. Año 11 Nº 17, julio – diciembre, 2010. pp.  97 - 118
resumen
En este artículo se argumenta que Frege no 
es el metafísico platónico sobre matemáticas 
que se considera normalmente. Se 
muestra que el proyecto fregeano tiene 
dos etapas distintas: la identificación de 
lo que es verdadero en nuestras nociones 
ordinarias, y luego la provisión de una 
explicación sistemática que comparte los 
aspectos identificados. Ninguna de estas 
etapas involucra mucha metafísica. El 
artículo critica en detalle la interpretación 
que hace Dummett de los parágrafos 
§§55-61 del Grundlagen. Estas secciones 
están bajo el encabezado ‘Todo número 
es un objeto auto-subsistente’ y Dummett 
las describe como las que contienen los 
peores argumentos planteados por Frege. 
Se arguye que, esencialmente, todos 
los puntos interpretativos de Dummett 
son erróneos. Finalmente, muestro que 
los planteamientos de Frege sobre la 
independencia de las matemáticas con 
respecto a los humanos y sus actividades 
tampoco lo comprometen con ninguna 
posición metafísica particular.
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abstract
This paper argues that Frege is not the 
metaphysical platonist about mathematics 
that he is standardly taken to be. It is 
shown that Frege’s project has two distinct 
stages: the identification of what is true 
of our ordinary notions, and then the 
provision of a systematic account that 
shares the identified features. Neither of 
these stages involves much metaphysics. 
The paper criticizes in detail Dummett’s 
interpretation of §§55-61 of Grundlagen. 
These sections fall under the heading 
‘Every number is a self-subsistent 
object’ and are described by Dummett 
as containing the worst arguments 
put forward by Frege. It is argued that 
essentially all of Dummett’s interpretive 
points are mistaken. Finally, I show that 
Frege’s claims about the independence 
of mathematics from humans and their 
activities does not commit him to any 
particularly metaphysical position either.
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INTRODUCTION
Frege is often described as perhaps the most prototypical realist in the 
philosophy of mathematics. It is important, however, to clearly separate 
what Frege says in terms of identifying desiderata for a systematic 
treatment of number from his remarks about how such a systematic 
treatment is to proceed. I contend that when this is done, what emerges 
is a picture of Frege as someone quite unconcerned with metaphysical 
issues. Neither of the two stages in providing a systematic account of 
arithmetic is particularly metaphysical. I hope mto show that Frege is 
largely unconcerned with establishing metaphysical theses of any kind.
The present paper has three sections. In the first I give a definition of 
metaphysical realism that ties the question of whether one is engaged in 
metaphysical issues to the aims of the project. I look at Frege’s statement 
of his aims and show that they do not support a metaphysical reading 
of his program. In the second section, I analyze in detail Dummett’s 
remarks (Dummett, 1991) on Frege’s arguments in §§55-61 of Grundlagen. 
I argue that Dummett’s interpretation is implausible, and implausible 
precisely because he interprets Frege as a metaphysical realist. In 
the third section, I turn to the question of Frege’s remarks about the 
independent existence of mathematical objects and the independent 
truth of mathematical propositions. I argue that, here as well, there is 
nothing about these remarks that is particularly metaphysical.
1. FREGE’S AIMS AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM
To properly understand Frege’s attitude towards the question of realism 
we need to look first at his goals. By carefully examining Frege’s stated 
aims, it becomes apparent that he is not the metaphysical realist that he 
is standardly taken to be. In fact, I believe that the connection between 
one’s overall goals and one’s stance on realism is so strong that one can 
be defined in terms of the other. That is, I will take it as definitional of 
the position of metaphysical realism that anyone who holds this position 
has as their overarching goal to describe how reality is in some ultimate 
sense1. In defining metaphysical realism in this way, I do not take myself 
1 Erich Reck, in his Frege’s infuence on Wittgenstein: reversing metaphysics versus the context principle. 
(In: TAIT, W. W. (Ed.). Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. (pp. 123-85). 
Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1997), argues that Frege is not a metaphysical realist 
in an argument that likens Frege’s use of the context principle to the philosophy of the later 
Wittgenstein.
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to be diverging from its standard sense. One is a metaphysical realist 
if, with your account –or of number, say– you try to correctly picture 
how the world is in some ultimate sense. To take a particularly fitting 
example, if one is giving an account that holds that numbers are objects, 
and in fact extensions of a certain kind, then that account is acceptable 
only if numbers really are particular kinds of extensions2. So, if being a 
metaphysical realist is a question of what one’s ultimate goals are, then 
examining what one says about one’s goals can help determine if one 
is a realist. Let us now, then, examine Frege’s remarks concerning the 
goals of his project:
In the introduction to Grundlagen, Frege describes his project by 
saying: “I realize that, as a result, I have been led to pursue arguments 
more philosophical than many mathematicians may approve; but any 
thorough investigation of the concept of number is bound always to 
turn out rather philosophical. It is a task that is common to mathematics 
and philosophy”3.
We see here Frege saying that he was forced by the nature of the subject 
matter to be somewhat philosophical. So, this already calls into question 
any view that holds that from the outset Frege sought to defend a position 
on the metaphysical status of arithmetic. He continues describing his 
project by saying: “Even I agree that definitions prove their worth by 
being fruitful”4. Here ‘Even I’ is in reference to Frege’s standards of 
proof, and is not a comment on his realism. Again: “Definitions show 
their worth by proving fruitful. (...) Let us try, therefore, [to see] whether 
we can derive from our definition of the Number which belongs to 
the concept F any of the well known properties of number”5 or again 
consider: “Now our concern here is to arrive at a concept of number usable 
for the purpose of science; we should not therefore, be deterred by the fact 
that in the language of everyday life number appears also in attributive 
constructions. That can always be got round”6.
2 Being a metaphysical realist in this sense is closely related to holding a correspondence theory 
of truth. See RICKETTS, T. “Objectivity and objecthood: Frege’s metaphysics of judgement”. In: 
HAAPARANTA, L. & HINTIKKA, J. (Eds.). Frege Synthesized. (pp. 65-95). Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1986; “Frege on logic and truth”. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 1996. 
vol. 70, p. 121-140 and RECK, E. H. “Frege on thruth, judgement, and objectivity”. In: Grazer 
Philosophische Studien, 2007. vol. 75, no. 1, p. 149-173, for convincing arguments that Frege did 
not see truth in this way.
3 FREGE, G. The Foundations of Arithmetic. 2d. ed. Evanston, IL: Northwstern University Press, 
1980. p. v.
4 Ibid., p. ix.
5 Ibid., §70. 
6 Ibid., §57, my emphasis.
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What, then, can we say about Frege’s goals? Frege believes that the goal 
in providing an analysis of number is to put forward a definition that 
is “usable for the purpose of science”. This condition is met if, from the 
definition, the ordinary properties of number are recoverable. So here we 
have what we can call Frege’s first desideratum concerning a definition 
of number. Let us call this the desideratum of standardness.
Asecond desideratum becomes apparent when Frege provides his own 
definition of numbers as extensions of second-order concepts. He states 
“That this definition is correct will perhaps be hardly evident at first. 
For do we not think of the extensions of concepts as something quite 
different from numbers? (...) [I]t is not usual to speak of a Number as 
wider or less wide than the extension of a concept; but neither is there 
anything to prevent us from speaking in this way, if such a case should 
ever occur”7.
Here we see Frege expressing some tolerance toward a definition of 
number. The definition need not match up exactly with our ordinary 
notion. The definition might confer on numbers properties that they did 
not previously have. Frege believes that the new properties conferred on 
number by his definition are harmless in the sense that they will arise so 
seldom as to not significantly affect the practice of arithmetic. This then 
can be seen as Frege’s second desideratum for an account of arithmetic. 
That is, an account should not assign new properties to number in such 
a way that it will have a serious impact on the practice of mathematics. 
Let us call this desideratum the desideratum of harmlessness. 
We have now identified Frege’s two desiderata for a definition of 
number. A definition should allow us to recover the properties we 
usually associate with number. It should also not introduce new 
properties that would alter the practice of mathematics. When he is 
criticizing competing definitions, it is clear that he is applying the same 
standards. Consider one of his earliest criticism of a rival view that is 
presented in the Grundlagen: “When Stricker, for instance, calls our ideas 
of number motor phenomena and makes them dependent on muscular 
sensations, no mathematician can recognize his numbers in such stuff 
or knows what to make of such propositions”8.
7 Ibid., §69.
8 Ibid., p. v.
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The problem with Stricker’s definition is that number as he defines it has 
essentially nothing in common with number as we ordinarily conceive 
it. Again consider Frege on a psychologistic accounts of number: 
If the number two were an idea, then it would have straight 
away to be private to me only. Another man’s idea is, ex 
vi termini, another idea. We should then have it might be 
many millions of twos on our hands. We should have to 
speak of my two and your two, of one two and of all twos. If 
we accept unconscious ideas, we should have unconscious 
twos among them, which would return subsequently to 
consciousness. As new generations of children grew up, 
new generations of twos would continually be born, and in 
the course of millennia these might evolve, for all we could 
tell, to such a pitch that two of them should make five. Yet 
in spite of all of this, it would still be doubtful whether there 
existed infinitely many numbers, as we ordinarily suppose. 
1010, perhaps, might be only an empty symbol, and there 
might exist no idea at all, in any being whatever, to answer 
to that name9.
One might interpret this as a straightforward reduction ad absurdum. On 
such an interpretation Frege’s goal here is to show that it is false that 
numbers are ideas by showing that it leads to absurdity. However, 
there is a problem with this interpretation. If this were his goal here, 
then when he presents his own definition of numbers as extensions, 
he would need to provide an argument to the effect that this is true. Of 
course, he provides no such argument. In fact, he says that although it 
might be somewhat artificial to take numbers to be extensions, there 
is nothing wrong with this. In light of the two identified desiderata, 
another interpretation becomes evident. Frege is not concerned with 
the question of whether numbers really are ideas or not. Frege is rejecting 
attempts to define numbers psychologistically precisely because such a 
definition would satisfy neither the desideratum of standardness, nor 
the desideratum of harmlessness. In fact the failure of one or the other 
of these desiderata is argued for in each sentence in the above quote.
Does what I have said so far show that Frege is not a realist? That is 
not what I want to claim at all. Frege takes numbers to be objects and 
takes mathematical claims to express objective truths. So, he is clearly 
a realist in a certain sense. What I am claiming is that there is nothing 
9 Ibid., §27, my emphasis.
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metaphysical about his realism. When Frege claims that numbers are 
objects and mathematical claims express objective truths, he is not 
making a metaphysical pronouncement. What he is doing is stating 
which features an account of number must have in order to satisfy what 
I have called his desideratum of standardness. Frege takes these to be 
properties of numbers as we ordinarily conceive of them, and therefore 
properties that ought to be preserved by an account of number. He does 
not take this to make any metaphysical claim about the ultimate nature 
of reality. In fact he warns against reading his claim that numbers are 
self-subsistent objects in this way: “The self-subsistence which I am 
claiming for number is not to be taken to mean that a number word 
signifies something when removed from the context of a proposition, 
but only to preclude the use of such words as predicates or attributes, 
which appreciably alters their meaning”10.
In this section I have tied the question of the degree to which an account 
of arithmetic is realist in a metaphysical sense to the expressed goals of 
the account. If the goal of the account is to reflect the ultimate nature of 
reality (or at least those features that concern the subject matter of the 
account), then it is a metaphysically realist position. We have seen that 
Frege’s stated goals are actually quite pragmatic. Frege wants to give an 
account of arithmetic “suitable for the purposes of science”. Although 
he claims, for instance, that numbers are self-subsistent objects, he does 
not mean for this to correctly picture how things in reality actually 
are in any metaphysical sense. As Ricketts (1986), Ricketts (1996), and 
Reck (2007), for instance, argue, Frege does not accept anything like the 
correspondence theory of truth.
Even if, however, Frege’s ultimate goal was not to give a theory that 
corresponds to the way the world is in itself, the question of truth 
cannot be completely avoided. Truth is a concept of central importance 
for Frege. In a language like that of Begriffsschrift, all of the provable 
judgements express truths. How is the quite pragmatic reading of Frege 
defended here consistent with the claim that provable judgements in 
Frege’s systematic languages express truths? To answer this we need 
to explore Frege’s discussion of the paradox of analysis. The paradox of 
analysis states that no analysis can be both informative and correct. If 
we say what it is to be A is to be B, then there are two possibilities. If ‘B’ 
has exactly the same meaning as ‘A’, then the analysis is uninformative. 
10 Ibid., §60.
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If ‘B’ means something different, then the account is incorrect. Frege 
provided several attempts at a solution to the paradox of analysis, but I 
will, here, focus on his final solution to the paradox11. Frege thought that 
even the pre-systematic use of scientific terms, presumably including 
‘number’, lack a completely clear meaning: “Now it may happen that 
this sign (word) is not altogether new, but has already been used in 
ordinary discourse or in a scientific treatment that precedes the truly 
systematic one. As a rule, this usage is too vacillating for pure science”12.
If even the scientific treatment of concepts such as ‘number’ has a use 
that is too vacillating, how is an analysis supposed to work? The answer 
is provided in ‘Logic in Mathematics’:
If we have managed in this way to construct a system of 
mathematics without the need for the sign A [a sign with 
an existing sense], we can leave the matter there; there is no 
need at all to answer the question concerning the sense in 
which –whatever it may be– this sign had been used earlier. 
In this way we court no objections. However it may be felt 
expedient to use the sign A instead of the sign B [the newly 
introduced sign]. But if we do this, we must treat it as an 
entirely new sign which has no sense prior to the definition. 
We must explain that the sense in which this sign was used 
before the new system was constructed is no longer of any 
concern to us, that its sense is to be understood purely 
from the constructive definitions that we have given. In 
constructing the new system we take no account, logically 
speaking, of anything in mathematics that existed prior to 
the new system. Everything has to be made anew from the 
ground up. Even anything we accomplish by our analytical 
activities is to be regarded only as preparatory work which 
does not itself make any appearance in the system itself13.
11 Frege (“Review: Husserl, philosophy of arithmetic”. In: McGUINNESS, B. (Ed.). Collected 
Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy (pp. 293–340). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984a) 
discusses the paradox explicitly (although, of course, not by that name). Michael Beaney discusses 
Frege’s views on analysis in BEANEY, M. Frege: Making Sense. London: Duckworth, 1996. chap 5 
and his “Carnap’s conception of explication: from Frege to Husserl?” (In: AWODEY, S. & KLEIN, 
C. (Eds.). Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (pp.117–150). Chicago and La Salle, IL: 
Open Court, 2004) including looking at his earlier attempts to avoid the paradox. Joan Weiner 
discusses problems related to Fregean analyses in WEINER, J. “What’s in a numeral? Frege’s 
answer”. In: Mind, 2007. vol. 116, no. 463, p. 677-71).
12 FREGE, G. “On the foundations of geometry: second series”. In: McGUINNESS, B. (Ed.) 
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy (pp. 293–340). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984b. p. 302-302.
13 FREGE, G. “Logic in mathematics”. In: HANS HERMES, F. K. & KAMBARTEL, F. (Ed.). 
Poshumous Writings (pp. 203-250). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. p. 211.
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We see here Frege’s final view on how an analysis is supposed to 
function. We begin by identifying what is true of the notion prior to its 
truly systematic treatment. This, however, is only the first step, and is a 
somewhat vague matter. We then replace the old term with a new one 
(or retain the old one as the new one for convenience). The new term’s 
meaning, however, is to follow exclusively from the definition –ties to the 
old notion are severed. As I have explained Frege’s aim in Grundlagen, he 
is engaged very much in a project along these lines. He does not argue 
that numbers really are and always have been extensions. He offers his 
definition as a replacement for our ordinary notion of number.
At this point, it will evidently be charged that I am reading Frege’s 
remarks from ‘Logic in mathematics’ back into Grundlagen, despite the 
two works being separated by thirty years. Of course, Frege did not 
have his views on analyses expressed in ‘Logic in mathematics’ worked 
out at the time of Grundlagen. This is evidenced by his formulating 
several intermediate positions on analysis in the intervening years. 
However, even if Frege did not have his general views on explication 
worked out by the time of Grundlagen, what he does in Grundlagen is 
nonetheless an instance of such an analysis. Frege makes no attempt to 
argue that numbers always were extension. He thinks that number as 
he defines it is sufficiently similar to the ordinary notion that it could 
be used in its place. In this section I have argued for an interpretation 
of Frege where his aims are more practical and less philosophical than 
standardly assumed. In the next section I turn to an interpretation at 
odds with this one.
2. DUMMETT ON §§55-61
Michael Dummett has defended a strongly realist interpretation of Frege. 
In fact, Dummett’s interpretation amounts to an interpretation of Frege 
as metaphysical realist in exactly the sense defined in the last section. 
Dummett takes Frege to hold that an account of arithmetic ought to 
reflect how things are in the world –and in particular the ontology of 
the world. Dummett writes “Frege’s realism was not the most important 
ingredient in his philosophy: but the attempt to interpret him otherwise 
than as a realist leads only to misunderstanding and confusion”14 I do 
not want to deny that Frege was a realist. Frege believed that numbers 
14 DUMMETT, M. “Frege as a realist”. In: SLUGA, H. (Ed.). Meaning and Ontology in Frege’s 
Philosophy, Vol. 3 of The Philosophy of Frege (pp. 109-122). New York & London: Garland, 1993. 
p. 109.
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are objects, and that numerical statements express objective truths. But 
unlike Dummett I don’t see these as Frege’s conclusions. Rather, these 
express desiderata concerning an account of number. So Frege certainly 
was a realist –just not a metaphysical realist. The measure of an account is 
not whether it correctly reflects the true structure of metaphysical reality, 
but that it preserve the properties that we standardly take numbers to 
have. In this section I wish to show that my interpretation of Frege’s 
realism allows for a clearly more appropriate interpretation of §§55-61. 
Dummett (1991) describes §§55-61 of Foundations (the sections that fall 
under the heading ‘Numbers are self-subsistent objects’) as containing 
some of the worst philosophical arguments presented by Frege15. 
Dummett discusses these sections at length in the chapter of Frege: 
Philosophy of Mathematics titled ‘Two strategies of analysis’. Here, 
Dummett distinguishes between two strategies for defining number. 
On the one hand, we could be radical substantivalists and begin by 
defining numerical terms and then translate adjectival uses of number 
into claims involving numerical terms. On the other hand, we can define 
adjectival uses of number and then translate all statements which involve 
numerical terms into ones that do not. This second strategy Dummett 
calls the radical adjectival strategy. In §55, as Dummett understands him, 
Frege proposes three definitions that pursue a radical adjectival strategy. 
That is, the definitions attempt to define our use of numbers as adjectives 
without the use of numerical terms. The definitions are stated as follows:
the number 0 belongs to a concept, if the proposition 
that a does not fall under that concept is true universally, 
whatever a may be.
the number 1 belongs to a concept F, if the proposition that 
a does not fall under F is not true universally, whatever a 
may be, and if from the propositions that “a falls under F” 
and “b falls under F” it follows universally that a and b 
are the same.
15 Wray, K. B. focusses exclusively on Dummett’s interpretation of x56. Although I agree with 
Wray that Dummett seriously misreads Frege here, I don’t see that Wray has identified what 
exactly it is about Dummett’s interpretation that is at fault. I do not think it is simply that “Frege is 
not trying to show that the adjectival strategy cannot make sense of our use of number statements, 
as Dummett suggests, but rather, his intention is to show that only the substantival strategy can 
provide us with an adequate definition of number” (“Reinterpreting section 56 of Frege’s The 
Foundations of Arithmetic”. In: Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy, 1995. vol. 20, no. 2, p. 79). 
The main reason I don’t think Wray’s interpretation is acceptable is that it is not altogether clear 
how it differs from Dummett’s. Presumably, if only a substantival view will be acceptable, then 
this itself is a strong argument against the adjectivalist.
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the number (n+1) belongs to the concept F, if there is an 
object a falling under F and such that the number n belongs 
to the concept “Falling under F, but not a”
However, on Dummett’s view:
In stating them, [Frege] makes heavy use of his jargon. 
Instead of saying ‘There is just 1 F’, (…) he says ‘The number 
1 belongs to the concept F’. This, of course, obscures the 
fact that these are adjectival uses of number words that he 
is defining16.
In §56 Dummett sees Frege as objecting to the adjectival definition 
of number just presented in §55. Frege presents two arguments here. 
The first involves the use of the variable n in the third definition. If 
numerical terms have not been defined, but only phrases containing 
numerical terms, then we are not free to use a variable that ranges 
over numbers. Dummett recognizes this as a valid criticism of Frege’s 
proposed definition. Dummett argues, however, that if Frege had taken 
the adjectival strategy more seriously he would have realized that this 
objection is not valid against all attempts to give an adjectival definition 
of number. As a result, Dummett spends much of the chapter providing 
an adjectival definition that avoids this difficulty while at the same time 
involving no numerical terms. Frege mentions, as an illustration of this 
problem with the third definition, that the proposed definition does not 
rule out Julius Caesar as a number. Dummett can make no sense of this; 
he merely states that no one reading the work for the first time could 
see this as relevant, and then he moves on.
The second objection that Frege puts forward is that the definitions 
do not allow us to show that if a and b are both numbers belonging 
to a concept F, then a = b. Concerning this, of course, Dummett points 
out that identity, for Frege, is a relation between objects. As such, 
Dummett sees this argument as completely question begging. As with 
his handling of the first objection, Dummett shows that with proper 
definitions this problem can be avoided. He does this by defining a 
relation between numerically definite quantifiers that can be used to 
show that only one numerically definite quantifier applies to a given 
concept. Concerning §56, Dummett writes: “Frege aimed to show all 
16 DUMMETT, M. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991. p. 100.
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three definitions erroneous, and thereby to prove a purely adjectival 
strategy unfeasible, because numbers have to be recognized as being 
objects. In this he utterly failed: in fact §56 may be stigmatized as the 
weakest in the whole of Grundlagen. The arguments lack all cogency: 
they more resemble sleight of hand”17.
Dummett sees §57 as merely a continuation of §56. Therefore, he sees it 
as just as question begging as the previous section. In addition to this, 
Dummett finds Frege to be self-undermining. Here Frege shows how 
we can translate adjectival uses of number into statements involving 
singular terms standing for numbers. But if we are free to reinterpret in 
one direction, why should we take the surface syntax seriously in the 
other? Dummett concludes that Frege has given no good argument that 
numbers are objects. Concerning §§58-61, Dummett has no objections. 
He merely points out that these sections contain quite admirable defense 
of the claim that numbers are objects against the possible objections 
that we can have no ideas of them or that they have no spatial location.
I seriously disagree with almost every aspect of Dummett’s 
interpretation of §§55-57. In the previous section, I argued that Frege 
is not a metaphysical realist. The way that Dummett interprets §§55-57 
is possible only on the assumption that Frege is a metaphysical realist. 
Dummett thinks that Frege is concerned to show that numbers really are 
objects, and sees §§55-57 as a sustained, but incredibly poor, argument 
to this effect. Dummett is here reading far too much into the text.
Dummett interprets Frege as proposing for consideration radical 
adjectival definitions of number in §55, and in so doing, using incredibly 
questionbegging jargon. However, there is nothing about §55 which 
suggests that Frege is considering a radical adjectival definition 
of number. After presenting his ‘fundamental thought’ in §46 and 
discussing it in the following sections, Frege says that this leads almost 
immediately to the definitions of §5518. In all three of these definitions, 
Frege includes what are clearly meant to be terms that stand for numbers 
(as objects). If one interprets these definitions as following the radical 
adjectival strategy, as Dummett does, the use of the definite articles that 
17 Ibid., p. 105.
18 On page 5 of Frege The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (Edited and translated 
by Montgomery Furth. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), Frege 
describes the claim that statements of numbers contain an assertion about a concept as the 
fundamental result of Grundlagen.
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appears in each of the three definitions must be chalked up to either a 
major oversight or major dishonesty. It is not clear which option is meant 
to be implied by Dummett’s phrase ‘question begging jargon’. If on 
the other hand, we assume that Frege chose consciously and without 
dishonesty to use the definite article in the definitions, then §55 contains 
a discussion of readily suggested but ultimately unacceptable definitions 
of numerical terms. Frege understands ‘the number n belongs to F’ as 
having the form B (n, F), where B (the ‘belongs to’ relation) is a relation 
between an object and a first level property. On this interpretation, §55 
does not contain radical adjectival definitions at all. Instead, what Frege 
is considering here is introducing numerical terms via the role they play 
in numerically definite quantifiers.
What then of §56? Of course, since §55 does not contain a radical 
adjectival definition of number, §56, which discusses these definitions, 
does not consider a radical adjectival strategy either. What Frege 
considers in this section is whether the numerical terms have been 
sufficiently well-defined. He concludes that they have not. The first 
reason given involves the introduction of the variable n ranging over the 
numbers in the third definition. His objection to this is that the variable 
ranging over numbers is illegitimate since the numbers have not yet 
actually been defined. To support this last point Frege mentions the 
Julius Caesar problem. Dummett, as we saw, says little of the mention 
of Caesar here other than that it is baffling. This is not surprising. If 
the definitions of §55 are not meant to contain numerical terms, then 
the substitution of Julius Caesar for a number does not make any sense at 
all. But on an interpretation where the definitions in §55 are meant to 
define numerical terms –that is terms for numbers as objects– it makes 
perfect sense. If numbers are objects, then a definition of number should 
tell you which objects are numbers and which are not. Dummett may 
be right that the mention of Caesar may be completely unexpected by 
first time readers, but as surprising as it maybe, on the interpretation 
defended here it is perfectly well motivated.
Frege then points out that it also does not follow from the definitions 
that if a and b are both numbers that belong to the same concept, that 
a = b. Dummett, in holding that the radical adjectival strategy is under 
consideration, sees Frege, by considering identities, as once again ‘taken 
in by his own jargon’ and assuming what he is trying to prove. However, 
if the definitions in §55 were never meant to be radical adjectival 
definitions, then a far more charitable interpretation is possible. If Frege 
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intended the definitions in §55 as definitions of numerical terms, then 
Frege is merely pointing out that the definitions do not allow us to derive 
a basic property of numbers –that for any (sortal) concept there is one 
and only one number of things that falls under it. Remember, we saw 
in the previous section that deriving the basic properties of number was 
Frege’s criterion of success for a definition of number.
Section 56 closes with the complaint that the definitions have only fixed 
the sense of the phrases ‘the number 0 belongs to’, ‘the number 1 belongs 
to’ but they do not allow us to pick out 0 and 1 as self-subsistent objects. 
Dummett sees §56 as intending to address the radical adjectivalist, and 
sees this remark as again incomprehensibly question begging. However, 
if the definitions were intended to introduce numerical terms, as the use 
of the definite article clearly suggests, then there is nothing question 
begging here. Frege is simply pointing out that the phrase ‘the number 
1’ has not been defined other than as part of ‘the number 1 belongs to’. 
That is, although the definition makes clear the contribution of the phrase 
‘the number 1 belongs to’ to sentences containing it, it does not show 
what the contribution of ‘the number 1’ is. Since, on the interpretation 
defended here, Frege is attempting in §55 to define numerical terms, this 
points to what is obviously a significant flaw in the definitions.
In §57 Frege does finally consider adjectival uses of number. This section 
does not merely continue the attack on the radical adjectival definition of 
number, as Dummett insists, but is in fact, the first place where purely 
adjectival uses of number are considered. Frege begins, however, by 
discussing the fundamental thought –“the content of a statement of 
number is an assertion about a concept”19. Frege is concerned that this 
might lead one to conclude that numbers are properties of concepts. If 
we examine statements of the form ‘the number n belongs to the concept 
F’, n appears as only part of what is predicated of F. As a mere part 
of the predicate we are not obliged to view numbers as properties of 
concepts. Frege then says “Precisely because it forms only an element 
of what is asserted, the individual number shows itself for what it is, a 
self subsistent object”. This may sound question begging, but it is not. 
The justification for this is not, as Dummett thinks, what was said in §56, 
but what comes immediately after. After this remark Frege says why 
he seeks to define numbers as objects. His first reason is that we often 
19 FREGE, The Foundations of Arithmetic. Op. cit., §46.
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attach the definite article to numbers. The second reason is that Frege 
believes that equations are best viewed as identities20.
Now, if, on the one hand, Frege’s goal were to show that numbers really 
are objects, then the reasons given in §57 are incredibly flimsy.21 I imagine 
it is for this reason that Dummett looks for further arguments against 
the radical adjectivalist in §56. Since the two, briefly stated, reasons are 
clearly insufficient to prove a strong metaphysical thesis, Dummett reads 
arguments for this thesis into the preceding sections. However, if, on the 
other hand, Frege’s goal were to “arrive at a concept of number usable 
for the purpose of science” –as he explicitly states it is at this very point 
in the text!–, then these reasons may be sufficient to motivate a definition 
of numbers as objects.
It might be objected that if §§55-56 do not consider the radical adjectival 
definition of number, then they ought not appear under the general 
heading ‘Every number is a self-subsistent object’ as the sections from 
55-61, in fact, do. We are now in a position to answer this objection. 
We saw that the definitions in §55 were put forward as being strongly 
suggested by the fundamental thought. These definitions were never 
meant to follow the adjectival strategy, but merely to pursue what might 
be suggested by the fundamental thought. Frege wants to show that 
even in these definitions, numbers are not properties of concepts. The 
inclusion of §§55-56 under this heading is to show that the fundamental 
thought does not force us to view numbers as properties of concepts. 
If Frege is right that the definitions given in §55 ‘suggest themselves 
so spontaneously in light of our previous results [the fundamental 
thought]’, then showing that they don’t commit us to a view of numbers 
20 Frege does give an argument for why we should view equations as identities in (FREGE, Logic 
in mathematics, Op. cit., p. 223). Here Frege argues against interpreting an equation as a problem 
and a solution. If we interpret the left hand side of , say, ‘4 + 3 = 7’ as a problem and the right hand 
side as a solution, then what are we to make of ‘(4 + 3) + 2 = 9’? It seems the left hand side would 
then be a problem of adding 2 to a problem. This argument may not rule out viewing equations 
as identities between entities of types other than objets, but shows that his interpretation of them 
as identities avoids a problem with an alternative view.
21 William Demopoulos (“Critical notice of Michael Dummett’s ‘Frege”. In: Philosophy of 
mathematics’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1993. vol. 23, no. 3, p. 477-496) argues that there 
is a further kind of justification for Frege’s taking numbers to be objects. Taking numbers to be 
objects allows Frege to prove that there are infinitely many numbers. Demopoulos compares this 
to the derivation of Kepler’s laws from Newton’s theory. In the second case it would be absurd 
to claim that the derivation of Kepler’s laws was merely a motivation for Newton’s theory, and 
that it offers no justificatory support. I admit that the derivation of the well known properties of 
numbers does offer some kind of support for the claim that numbers are objects. But exactly how 
it lends support and whether or not it lends any support to a metaphysical realist’s interpretation 
of the claim that numbers are objects, I will not settle here.
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as properties of concepts is important, since Frege intends to define 
numbers as objects. Dummett eventually puts forward an adjectival 
definition of number that avoids the problems that Frege identifies with 
his own definition, but does not defend the claim that these definitions 
are suggested immediately by the fundamental thought. I will not myself 
weigh in on whether Frege is right that it is the definitions in the form 
he provides which most naturally suggest themselves in light of the 
fundamental thought. But I will simply point out that if he is right, then 
the fundamental thought does not give us any reason to treat numbers 
as anything other than objects. This is because the definitions contain, 
explicitly and as I have argued intentionally, numerical terms.
Frege does eventually, still in §57, consider constructions such as ‘Jupiter 
has four moons’. In these constructions, ‘four’ is not a mere part of a 
predicate. Here, for the first time in these sections, a straightforwardly 
adjectival construction is under consideration. But we see that Frege 
makes no attempt to show that interpreting numbers as objects gets 
things right in some ultimate metaphysical sense, and that interpreting 
numbers adjectivally would get things wrong. His attitude at this point 
is purely pragmatic. He merely claims (as quoted earlier): “we should 
not (…) be deterred by the fact that in the language of everyday life 
number appears also in attributive constructions. That can always be 
got round”22.
Remember that for the present purposes, ‘metaphysical realism’ was 
defined in terms of the criteria one accepts for acceptability of the 
account one is putting forward. That is, does one take an important 
criteria to be that the account reflects how things actually stand in the 
world? The pragmatic attitude expressed here is incompatible with 
metaphysical realism. If there really is a fact of the matter of whether 
numbers are objects, and the measure of an account is that it reflects 
how things really are in the world, then this is a serious question that 
would deserve serious attention. Frege essentially devotes no attention 
to this question. All he does is give a couple of reasons for why he takes 
numbers to be objects. If one assigns Frege the lofty goal of showing 
that numbers are objects in the sense of the metaphysical realist, then 
Frege’s arguments must be seen as unbelievably weak. However, if 
one interprets Frege as having the more modest goal of providing a 
firm foundation for mathematics, such that numbers have the various 
22 FREGE, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Op. cit.
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features we standardly take them to have, then one can provide a far 
more palatable interpretation of these sections.
3. INDEPENDENCE
I have given an interpretation of Frege such that he is not defending any 
metaphysical position. When he claims that numbers are self-subsistent 
objects or that arithmetical claims state objective truths, he is merely 
stating what he takes to be true of our ordinary conception of number. 
In stating the properties of our ordinary notion of number, Frege is not 
engaging in metaphysics, but identifying what features a systematic 
treatment of number should preserve. When he does offer a systematic 
account, he takes it to be justified in terms of its agreement with ordinary 
notions: “The reader will recognize that my basic principles at no point 
lead to consequences that he is not himself forced to acknowledge as 
correct”23.
Consider also this passage comparing psychological versus logical 
foundations: 
It is prima facie improbable that such a structure could be 
erected on a base that is uncertain or defective. Anyone 
who holds other convictions has only to try to erect a 
similar structure upon them, and I think he will perceive 
that it does not work, or at least does not work so well. As 
a refutation in this I can only recognize someone’s actually 
demonstrating either that a better, more durable edifice can 
be erected upon other fundamental convictions, or else that 
my principles lead to manifestly false conclusions24.
What is important about this quote, for our purposes, is what he says 
about what he would take as a refutation of his system. So long as it 
does not lead to false consequences or turns out to be demonstrably 
inferior to another system, it should be accepted. This hardly seems like 
the standards of someone who thinks the primary goal of an account is 
to correctly reflect how things are in the world in some ultimate sense.
23 FREGE, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System. Op. cit., p. 9.
24 Ibid., p. 25.
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But what of Frege’s insistence that the truth of mathematical statements 
is independent of anything any human does? It may seem that this 
independence is in conflict with the interpretation provided here, but 
that is not the case. We will examine this on two fronts. First, we will 
look at the question of the independent existence of mathematical 
objects. We will then turn to the question of the of the independence of 
mathematical propositions.
Let us then begin with the question of the independence existence of 
mathematical objects. We saw above that when Frege identifies numbers 
with extensions, no effort is made to show that this is true in any absolute 
sense. He does not hold that numbers really are and have always 
been extensions, but thinks that such an identification in a systematic 
treatment of number is justifiable in that it satisfies the two desiderata 
discussed in the first section. But what of other objects Frege wished to 
include in his systematic treatment of arithmetic? There are two of these: 
truth-values and courses-of-values. We see that in both of these cases 
Frege cites practical reasons for their introduction. Concerning courses-
of-values he writes: “The introduction of courses-of-values of functions 
is a vital advance, thanks to which we gain far greater flexibility”25. And 
concerning the truth-values he claims: “How much simpler and sharper 
everything becomes by the introduction of truth-values, only detailed 
acquaintance with this book can show. These advantages alone put a 
great weight in the balance in favor of my own conception, which indeed 
may seem strange at first sight”26.
These hardly amount to arguments that truth-values and courses-of-
values are objects in some ultimate metaphysical sense.
Of course, Frege does claim, repeatedly, that we cannot create objects 
with definitions. In Grundgesetze Frege says that the mathematician can 
no more create an object by definition than can the geographer create a 
sea by giving a particular portion of the Earth’s surface the name ‘the 
Yellow Sea’. Is Frege here making a metaphysical claim that numbers 
exist in some absolute sense? No, Frege is not engaging in metaphysics 
here at all. This can be seen from the clearly logical point that he goes 
on to make:
25 Ibid., p. 6.
26 Ibid., p. 7.
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Now suppose one defines, for instance, the number zero, 
by saying: it is something which yields one when added to 
one. In so doing one has defined a concept, by specifying 
what property an object must have in order to fall under 
the concept. But this property is not a property of the 
concept defined. People frequently seem to fancy that by the 
definition something has been created that yields one when 
added to one. A great delusion! The concept defined does 
not possess this property, nor is the definition any guarantee 
that the concept is realized –a matter requiring separate 
investigation. Only when we have proved that there exists 
at least and at most one object with the required property 
are we in a position to invest this object with the proper 
name “zero”. To create zero is consequently impossible27.
So, basic principles that introduce objects of certain kinds (e.g. courses-
ofvalues) are to be accepted or not on practical grounds. They are to be 
accepted if their introduction gives us the kind of system that we are 
looking for –that is, in this case, one that could play the required role in 
the foundations of mathematics. Frege’s point, about it being impossible 
to create an object with a definition, is a logical and not metaphysical 
point. It is aimed at those who mistakenly believe that by defining a 
concept we thereby define into existence an object of which it is true. In 
neither of these cases, then, are Frege’s concerns metaphysical.
Let us then turn to the question of the independence of assertions 
involving number. Here again, Frege believes that it is a feature of 
our ordinary conception of number that ought to be preserved by 
a systematic account. There is nothing all that metaphysical about 
imagining a world without people. If a biologist claims that if there 
had been no humans the wooly mammoth would still exist, this is not 
a metaphysical claim. It does not seem any more metaphysical to claim 
that it is true according to our ordinary conception of number that, even 
in a world without people, if a certain area contains two pebbles and 
also two other pebbles, then there are at least four pebbles in that area. 
Now if the truth conditions for statements of number involved ideas 
in people’s minds, then nothing would be true of number in a world 
with no people. So Frege takes it that a definition of number should 
not mention people or their ideas. In a passage clearly related to the 
one discussed above, concerning the Yellow Sea, Frege writes: “If we 
say that “the North Sea is 10,000 square miles in extent” then neither 
27 Ibid., p. 11-12.
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by “North Sea” nor by “10,000” do we refer to the state of or process 
in our minds: on the contrary, we assert something objective, which is 
independent of our ideas and everything of the sort”28.
Again, it is evident here that his target is psychologistic accounts of 
number. He is saying that the claim “the North Sea is 10,000 square miles 
in extent” makes no reference to people and so should be true whether 
or not there are any people. This independence is again identified as 
a desideratum of a systematic account of number. This desideratum is 
obviously not satisfied by a psychologistic account of number. But Frege 
does not hold that our presystematic understanding of number already 
have perfectly clear truth conditions: “Since it is only in the context of 
a proposition that words have meaning, our problembecomes this: To 
define the sense of a proposition in which number words occur. That, 
obviously, leaves us still a wide choice”29.
Our ordinary conception of number has the feature that the truth of 
such claims is independent of us and any of our activities. However, in 
giving a systematic treatment of number, we still have some freedom 
in how we define number. What we want of such a definition is that it 
satisfies our quite practical desiderata.
Thus we see, Frege’s talk of independence does not commit him to 
metaphysical positions. Concerning basic principles that introduce 
entities, Frege sees their acceptance as being a pragmatic question. In 
terms of the independent truth of mathematical statements, this need 
not be interpreted as involving any metaphysics30.
CONCLUSIONS
We saw that Frege describes the purpose of his project as arriving at ‘a 
concept of number usable for the purpose of science’. To this end, two 
28 FREGE, The Foundations of Arithmetic. Op. cit., §26.
29 Ibid., §62.
30 Burge, T. (Truth Thougt Reason: essays on Frege. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005) repeatedly defends the position that the pragmatic aspect that I discuss are present in Frege, 
but at the end of the day, Frege takes the pragmatic success of his system to be evidence for its 
metaphysical truth. Although, I cannot, at this point, discuss Burge’s arguments in detail, I do not 
think he has provided sufficient argument for the claim that despite all the pragmatic elements in 
Frege’s writings, he is nonetheless a metaphysical realist. Burge’s main line of argument for his 
position is the independence just discussed. But if this need not be interpreted metaphysically, 
then I see little reason for a metaphysical interpretation of Frege’s writings.
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desiderata were identified: the desideratum of standardness and the 
desideratum of harmlessness. The desideratum of standardness holds 
that the properties we ordinarily associate with number should also hold 
of numbers in a systematic treatment. The desideratum of harmlessness 
holds that any new properties a definition confers on number should not 
significantly change the practice of mathematics. A systematic treatment 
that satisfies these desiderata would seem to fully satisfy Frege. There is 
no further requirement that the systematic treatment reflect how things 
are in the world in some ultimate sense.
We then looked in detail at §§55-61 of Grundlagen. Whereas Dummett 
sees Frege as addressing the radical adjectivalist in §55 and §56, we saw 
there was nothing in those sections to suggest that. In fact, it is quite 
clear that Frege intends in these sections to define numerical terms. It 
is a further advantage of my interpretation, unlike that of Dummett, 
that it can make sense of the Julius Caesar objection as it appears in 
these passages. Only if it is numerical terms being defined is Julius 
Caesar a legitimate substitution instance. Finally, in §57, when Frege 
does consider purely adjectival uses of number, he expresses a purely 
pragmatic attitude. This is not consistent with a metaphysical view of 
numbers as objects.
In the last sections we looked at Frege remarks concerning the 
independent existence of number and the independent truth of 
arithmetical propositions. It was shown that on neither of these issues 
need we interpret Frege as holding a metaphysical thesis. When he says 
we cannot create objects with our definition, he is making a logical, rather 
than metaphysical, point. When he claims that arithmetical propositions 
are true completely independently of us, he is saying that we ought not 
define number such that truths of number depend on truths about us.
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